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Durham: Innocent Until Suspected Guilty

INNOCENT UNTIL SUSPECTED GUILTY
Rebekah Durham*

INTRODUCTION
America is in the midst of an incarceration crisis. The United States
locks up more of its citizens per capita than any other nation, with 698 out
of 100,000 people confined at any given time.1 2.3 million Americans are
currently living “in a cage.”2 The harm is even more pronounced among
minorities; one in three black men will be locked up at some point in their
lives.3 The calls of civil rights activists to reform the U.S. criminal justice
system have been growing stronger each year as mass incarceration
persists.4 But although the problem of mass incarceration may seem
simple—too many people are imprisoned—the solution must be multifaceted, because the laws and institutions that contribute to mass
incarceration in the U.S. are numerous.5 This Comment focuses on one of
these laws: the federal presumption against bail for serious crimes.
Many incarcerated persons in the U.S. are not serving a prison sentence
but are instead being held in custody while they await trial. Out of the 2.3
million incarcerated individuals, almost half a million are being held in
jail without having been convicted of a crime.6 In the federal system,
pretrial detention rates are particularly alarming, with almost three out of
four people charged with federal crimes being jailed before trial.7 Even
excluding immigration cases, where suspects are held in custody almost
without exception, fifty-nine percent of federal defendants were detained
pretrial in 2016.8 For defendants charged with federal drug crimes, the
percentage was eighty-four percent of all federal pretrial defendants.9
Time in custody is not a short span, either. In 2016, the average length of
* Publications Editor, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (March 24, 2020).
2. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, TENTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION xxix (2020).
3. Id. at 11.
4. See Brennan Hoban, The Need for Criminal Justice Reform, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(August 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/08/30/the-need-for-criminaljustice-reform/ (collection of video presentations from a Brookings event on criminal justice reform).
5. ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
6. Sawyer, supra note 1.
7. Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, PROBATION
AND PRETRIAL SERVICES OFFICE (September 2018).
8. Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release Rates,
PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES OFFICE (September 2017). This was an increase of six percent from
the number in 2006.
9. Id. This was an increase of eight percent from the number in 2006.
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time that a pretrial defendant spent behind bars was 255 days.10 Some
jurisdictions averaged over 400 days.11
This Comment argues that the federal presumption against bail for
serious crimes, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), is unconstitutional
because it presumes guilt based first and foremost on the nature of charges
not yet proven against the defendant. Part II examines the presumption of
innocence in U.S. law and how that presumption applies to pretrial
detention. Part II also discusses the origins and history of bail and the
1984 Bail Reform Act, which created the federal presumption against bail
for serious crimes. Part III argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), which
codifies the presumption of detention for serious crimes, is
unconstitutional. Part III first explains why the presumption of detention
is facially inconsistent with the liberty safeguards built into other
provisions of the Bail Reform Act. Part III then addresses why the
presumption of detention assumes guilt by requiring a judge to assess a
not-yet-convicted individual’s dangerousness to the community. Finally,
Part III discusses how the presumption of detention has been applied in a
way that undermines Congress’s original intentions.
II. BACKGROUND
Section A of this Part will begin by examining the origins of the
presumption of innocence in U.S. law and how the presumption
implicates a defendant’s right to release before trial. Next, Section B will
briefly examine the history of the bail process before the passage of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“1984 Amendments”). Finally, Section C will
explain the changes under the 1984 Amendments, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Amendments, and the current state of the
right to pretrial release under federal law.
A. The Presumption of Innocence
Regarded as one of the bedrocks of free society, the presumption of
innocence has defined the U.S. criminal justice system since its inception.
The principle that one is innocent until proven guilty predates the
founding of the nation. The 1895 Supreme Court case Coffin v. United
States explored the history of the presumption of innocence, tracing it
back to the Bible and to ancient Roman law.12 Later, as U.S. criminal law
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-57 (1895) (referencing the Book of Deuteronomy,
the Roman code during the times of Emperors Trajan and Julian, and three of the greatest English jurists:
John Fortescue, Lord Hale, and Blackstone).
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continued to develop through the 20th century, the presumption of
innocence remained so fundamental that to infringe upon it amounted to
a constitutional violation of due process.13
In Coffin, Justice White laid out the historical progression of the
presumption of innocence.14 He began by asserting that the “presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.”15 Beginning with the Roman
emperors, Justice White traced the presumption of innocence through
English history.16 He cited the great English jurist William Blackstone,
who maintained that “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer.”17 Justice White concluded with a
quote from an 1817 English case that summed up why the law must
include a presumption of innocence:
I conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which
has reason, and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim
which ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every
judge and juryman …. To overturn this, there must be legal evidence of
guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only absolute certainty.18

Coffin thereby reaffirmed that the U.S. colonial legal system was heavily
influenced by the principles of English law, and the presumption of
innocence became just as fundamental to American criminal justice as it
did in England.19
In 1970, the Supreme Court held in In re Winship that the standard of
proof requiring guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” must be proven for
each element of a criminal case and explained that the presumption of
innocence is a principle that could not be compromised.20 In Winship, a
twelve-year-old boy was found guilty of theft under a New York law that
required only a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof in
13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
14. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453-57.
15. Id. at 453.
16. Id. at 454.
17. Id. at 456.
18. Id. (quoting McKinley's Case (1817), 33 St. Tr. 275, 506).
19. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 723 (2011)
(Professor Baradaran explains the operation of the presumption of innocence in English law with regard
to bail: “While there was some discretion and bail was not always allowed for every alleged crime, it was
generally presumed for all accused due largely to the presumption of innocence. English bail law
presumed that defendants would be released and discussed the ‘bail decision’ as though it were a decision
of how to release the defendant, not if he would be released. To deny bail to a person who is later
determined to be innocent was thought to be far worse than the smaller risk posed to the public by releasing
the accused.” Baradaran then goes on to discuss how the British principles translated into U.S. law and
specifically applied to the right to bail.).
20. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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juvenile cases.21 “Preponderance of the evidence” only requires it to be
more likely than not that the defendant is guilty, while “beyond a
reasonable doubt” is the highest burden of proof in the legal system.22 In
finding that the use of the lower standard of proof violated the boy’s
constitutional due process rights, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
reasonable-doubt standard […] provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’
principle.”23 To violate this principle, the Court concluded, would impose
“a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness.”24 The
Court in Winship therefore viewed the presumption of innocence as so
foundational and important, that to violate it would violate constitutional
due process.25
The Court has also stated that the presumption of innocence is a driving
force behind the right to bail before trial. In 1951, the Court addressed
bail and pretrial detention in Stack v. Boyle, where twelve members of the
Communist party were charged with conspiring to overthrow the
government.26 Bail was set at $50,000 for each individual.27 The
defendants challenged this bail as excessive under the Eighth
Amendment, presenting evidence that they were unable to pay such a high
sum.28 The Court agreed that the bail was excessive and equated the
presumption of innocence with the right to freedom before trial, writing
that “[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption
of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning.”29 The Court further explained that pretrial release “permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction.”30 Not only did the Court view the
right to bail as a fundamental safeguard of liberty, it also recognized the
key role that pretrial release had played in securing other due process
rights that are guaranteed to criminal defendants.31
Legal scholars have recognized that the presumption of innocence is
21. Id. at 360.
22. State v. King, 2014-Ohio-4189, p.11 (Ohio Ct. App., 2014) (“[A]t trial, the State must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest burden in our system of criminal jurisprudence.”).
23. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 364 (“Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government
has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, at 525-26)).
26. Stephen M. Scott, Criminal Constitutional Law—Any Means to an End: Bail, the Constitution,
and the Liberty Interest, 27 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 2, Article 47 (2000).
27. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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now considered a constitutional right under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses. According to Professor Rinat Kitai,
“[t]he presumption of innocence was recognized in the second half of the
eighteenth-century as a basic constitutional right granted to every
person.”32 Professor Shima Baradaran connects due process with the
presumption of innocence and the right to bail, writing that “the
presumption of innocence was rooted in the Due Process Clause,
requiring release on bail for defendants charged with noncapital crimes
and requiring that a determination of guilt not occur until trial.”33 The link
between the presumption of innocence and the right to bail is historically
rooted and well-established.
The presumption of innocence does not, however, entitle every person
charged with a crime to wander wherever he likes.34 In order to function,
the justice system sometimes requires the detention of individuals who
have not yet been convicted of a crime, and the Supreme Court has
justified pretrial detention as a procedural necessity that does not require
any adjudication of a person’s guilt or innocence.35 In 1979, the Court
held in Bell v. Wolfish that the presumption of innocence did not mean
that a defendant awaiting trial must always be treated identically to a
person who has not been charged.36 Bell involved a class action case filed
by detainees at a New York prison, who alleged that the presumption of
innocence was violated by the poor conditions in which they were being
housed while awaiting trial.37
The Court in Bell said that the presumption of innocence had “no
application to determine the rights of a pretrial detainee during
confinement” because there was no dispute over whether the government
had the right to detain the individuals in the first place.38 The Court
reasoned that the presumption of innocence did not apply to the specific
conditions of confinement when both sides acknowledged that the
confinement itself was permissible.39 In dispensing with the defendants’
argument, the Court explained that its holding was “not concerned with
the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty that
such a decision necessarily entails.”40 Thus, the Court differentiated
32. Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 263 (2002).
33. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 723 (2011).
34. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
35. Id. at 536 (“A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of
any crime. He has had only a ‘judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended
restraint of [his] liberty following arrest.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975))).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 524-27.
38. Id. at 533-34.
39. Id. at 534.
40. Id. at 533-34.
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between decisions that require an adjudication of guilt or innocence,
where the presumption of innocence may come into play, and mere
procedural decisions, such as detention conditions, where it does not.41
The presumption of innocence affects many parts of the trial process.
It requires that a person cannot be punished without being convicted in a
court of law42 and it imposes the burden of proof on the government in
criminal trials.43 Overall, the presumption of innocence is interwoven
throughout the U.S. criminal justice system so thoroughly that it reaches
into virtually every corner of the law—including bail and pretrial
release.44 Although the Court has not extended criminal defendants the
right to unconditional release before trial, it has emphatically stated that
the presumption of innocence and due process protect the rights of
individuals to not be found guilty before evidence is presented at trial.45
B. Traditional Role of Bail in the United States
The Eighth Amendment provides that “excessive bail shall not be
required.”46 Bail in the U.S. has traditionally been a tool used by courts
to ensure that criminal defendants appeared for future court appointments
and trial. Before the Bail Reform Acts passed in 1966 and 1984, cash bail
was the norm. This Section explores the evolution of bail in U.S. criminal
justice processes and the Bail Reform Act of 1984’s major changes to
those processes, culminating in the system we have today.
1. Defining Bail
A person charged with a crime is entitled to pretrial release, either on
the basis of his promise to return for trial or on bail.47 If released on bail,

41. Id. at 537 (“Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person
pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention. …
Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of
freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility.”).
42. Id. at 535.
43. Id. at 532.
44. Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
45. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86, (1978) (“This Court has declared that one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other
circumstances not adduced as proof at trial. […] While use of the particular phrase "presumption of
innocence" -- or any other form of words -- may not be constitutionally mandated, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment must be held to safeguard ‘against dilution of the principle that guilt is to
be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’”).
46. U.S. Const. am. VIII.
47. Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1125 (Feb. 9, 2018).
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the individual pays a sum of money to the court as a security that is
returned only when the individual come backs and stands trial.48 The bail
system goes back to the very beginning of the American criminal justice
system, and it was traditionally meant to ensure that the individual
charged returned to court for his trial.49 “The right to release before trial
is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will
stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”50 For the majority of
U.S. history, the question of bail was not whether the defendant deserved
to be locked up but rather whether he was likely to return for trial,
fulfilling his end of the bargain struck between himself and the court.51
It should be noted that the terms “bail” and “bond” generally refer to
the money paid to a court in exchange for pretrial release.52 Bail refers to
a financial deposit paid to the court to secure the defendant’s release.53
The court returns the bail money to the defendant when he comes to stand
trial, and if he misses any of his hearings, the court has the right to keep
the bail money.54 Bond, on the other hand, specifically describes a
promise by a third party to the court on behalf of a defendant who cannot
afford his bail.55 In short, bail is the price set by the court in exchange for
release, and bond is the promise of a third party to pay a criminal
defendant’s bail. In literature discussing pretrial release, both terms may
be used, as the particular payment scheme is not typically relevant.
2. Right to Bail Before 1984
Before 1966, U.S. law required that anyone charged with a non-capital
crime must be admitted to bail.56 Although this right to bail had been in
place since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ability to post bail was limited
by a defendant’s financial resources.57 Thus, indigent defendants often
were unable to secure release.58 Before 1966, the pretrial process was a
“dismal picture of a system which trades freedom for money,” marked by

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
51. Bail Reform, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (“From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the
present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 46, federal law has unequivocally provided that a person
arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.”).
57. Austin, supra note 8.
58. Id.
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a “pattern of pretrial detention.”59
Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the “1966 Act”) to
reduce some of the disparities between defendants with differing financial
abilities.60 The 1966 Act’s purpose was “to assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal,
when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”61
The 1966 Act not only replaced most financial bonds with non-monetary
release conditions, it also explicitly provided that the only permissible
consideration for setting bail was ensuring the defendant’s return to
court.62 Essentially, the 1966 Act shifted the focus of bail from finance to
a defendant’s character. Most importantly, the 1966 Act created a
presumption of release without payment, meaning that the starting point
for every criminal defendant would be release on his own recognizance
rather than upon payment of bail.63
After the 1966 Act’s overhaul of the federal bail system, all fifty states
quickly updated their codified bail practices to match the federal
scheme.64 These changes resulted in a notable drop in pretrial detention
numbers. In the twenty years after passage of the 1966 Act, the portion of
the jail population in custody awaiting trial fell from sixty percent to
roughly thirty-five percent.65
3. The War on Drugs
Although the goal of the 1966 Act was to reduce pretrial detention
rates, especially among defendants with limited resources, concerns
quickly developed that the new system was too lenient.66 Particularly,
critics worried that judicial officers were not permitted under the statute
to consider a defendant’s likelihood of committing additional crimes upon

59. Patricia M. Wald and Daniel J. Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner's Primer,
52 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 10, 940-45 (1966).
60. Austin, supra note 8.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 4141-51, repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 202-03, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 4141-51 (repealed).
63. Wald, supra note 59.
64. Sam Walker, LBJ Signs Bail Reform Act; Affirms Rights of Criminal Suspects, TODAY IN
CIVIL LIBERTIES HISTORY (2013), http://todayinclh.com/?event=lbj-signs-bail-reform-act-affirms-rightsof-criminal-suspects.
65. Id.
66. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
STAN. L. REV. 711, 719 (2017) (“In the 1970s and 1980s, concerns about rising rates of pretrial crime led
to a second wave of reform, this time directed at identifying and managing defendants who posed a threat
to public safety.”).
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his return to the community pretrial.67 The Office of the Attorney General
created a Task Force on Violent Crime to address these concerns, which
recommended several changes to the bail system to keep those deemed to
“present a danger” locked up before trial.68
The concerns raised about the leniency of the bail system coincided
with the advent of the infamous “war on drugs.” 69 The Controlled
Substances Act was passed in 1970.70 In 1971, President Nixon famously
declared drug abuse to be “public enemy number one,” and the Drug
Enforcement Agency was created three years later.71 The government’s
focus on “cracking down” on drug use grew stronger under the Reagan
administration, particularly with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, which established mandatory minimums for a number of drug
offenses.72 The war on drugs is considered a primary factor in the
expansion of incarceration among the U.S. population.73 According to
Michelle Alexander, “[t]he impact of the drug war has been astounding.
In less than thirty years, the U.S. penal population exploded from around
300,000 to more than 2 million, with drug convictions accounting for the
majority of the increase.”74
Additionally, the federal criminal system is much more heavily
inundated with drug crimes than state systems.75 Today, although
individuals convicted of drug crimes make up only about fifteen percent
of state prisoners, they comprise about forty-five percent of federal
prisoners.76 In a world where eighty four percent of federal defendants
charged with drug crimes are held in pretrial detention, the effect of the
increase in drug arrests and charges was magnified.77
67. Austin, supra note 8.
68. Id. The recommendations from the Task Force included considering dangerousness to
particular persons or the community when considering whether to admit an individual to bail, as well as
denying bail to those previously convicted of a serious crime while on pretrial release.
69. National Public Radio, Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NPR.ORG (2007),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490.
70. JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
(CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS (Feb. 5, 2021).
71. National Public Radio, supra note 69.
72. Deborah J. Vagins and Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty Years of the Unjust
Federal Crack Cocaine Law, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2006).
73. ALEXANDER, supra note 2 (“As I see it, the War on Drugs – more than any other government
program or political initiative – gave rise to mass incarceration […]The declaration and escalation of the
War on Drugs marked a moment in our past when a group of people defined by race and class was viewed
and treated as the ‘enemy.’ A literal war was declared on a highly vulnerable population, leading to a
wave of punitiveness that permeated every aspect of our criminal justice system and redefined the scope
of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. at xxviii).
74. Id. at 7.
75. Sawyer, supra note 1.
76. Id.
77. See Part I, page 2 supra.
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C. The Right to Bail After 1984
1. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Congress felt pressure from both the public and the executive branch
to combat drugs and ensure community safety.78 It responded by passing
the 1984 Amendments to the Bail Reform Act (“1984 Amendments”).79
The 1984 Amendments made two important and fundamental changes to
federal bail procedures. First, in addition to judicial officers being
directed to ensure defendants’ appearances at trial, the 1984 Amendments
also mandated that they should consider the “safety of the community” if
defendants were to be released.80 Second, the amendments authorized
pretrial detention without bail for individuals charged with certain
serious, non-capital crimes.81 This stood in contrast to nearly two
centuries of federal law that had consistently required that non-capital
defendants be admitted to bail.82
Under the 1984 Amendments, persons facing federal charges must be
released before trial on their own recognizance, unless the judge
“determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person
or the community.”83 If a judge determines that a defendant’s pretrial
release is insufficient to assure his appearance, the judge may order
release with one or more conditions attached.84 Sometimes the court will
release a defendant into the custody of a family member who assumes
responsibility for his behavior and return to trial.85 In other cases, the
defendant awaiting trial is restricted in his activities or permissive range
of travel.86 Conditional release may also be accomplished through use of
a bail bond, under which the defendant’s financial obligation is expected
to assure his return to court.87 However, the court might determine that
no set of conditions or restrictions is enough to ensure that a person will
return to court for trial, and then the person is kept in custody until the
78. Austin, supra note 8 (“[A] 1984 Senate report stated, ‘Considerable criticism has been leveled
at the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] in the years since its enactment because of its failure to recognize the
problem of crimes committed by those on Pretrial release. In just the past year, both the President and the
Chief Justice have urged amendment of federal bail laws to address this deficiency.’” (quoting Senate
Report No. 98-225, at 3)).
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
82. See n.56, page 9 supra.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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trial can take place.88
The 1984 Amendments not only authorized a judge to deny bail based
on a determination that a defendant might be a danger to his community,
but it created a statutory presumption against bail for persons charged
with various serious crimes.89 This presumption is codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(3), which states that “it shall be presumed that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer
finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed…”
one of approximately twelve different crimes.90 Those crimes include
felony drug offenses, firearm offenses, and threats of terrorism, all of
which carry sentences of at least ten years.91 If the judge determines that
there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime
with which he is charged, that determination triggers the presumption
against bail.92 Probable cause, the same standard of proof that must be
met for police to arrest and charge an individual, is a relatively low
standard, below “clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”93 Thus, if a defendant is properly charged with any of
the serious crimes subject to the presumption against bail, he will also
meet the criteria for detention before trial.
The 1984 Amendments contains some statutory safeguards regarding
the presumption against bail’s intended application. Despite the
presumption of detention, the statute requires that each defendant have
the opportunity to appear at a pretrial release hearing before a judge, and
the facts the judge considers must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.94 At this “adversarial” hearing, the defendant has the
opportunity to prove that he should be released before trial.95 In theory,
prosecutors can also choose whether to request pretrial detention;
however, federal prosecutors pursued detention in more than seventy-five
percent of federal cases in 2019.96
Surprisingly, evidence suggests that releasing defendants on bond to
await trial would neither significantly increase rates of recidivism nor
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
93. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 271 (1986).
94. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3142(f).
95. Id (“At the hearing, the person has the right to be represented by counsel, and … shall be
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the
hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.”).
96. Alison Siegler & Kate Harris, How Did the ‘Worst of the Worst’ Become 3 out of 4? N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2021).
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failures to later appear in court. Less than one percent of federal
defendants released on bond in 2019 failed to appear for trial, and less
than two percent were arrested again while out on bond.97 A study
conducted by the Prison Policy Initiative from 2017 to 2020 found that,
after examining pretrial policy reforms in thirteen jurisdictions across
four states, “the results were the same: Releasing people pretrial did not
negatively impact public safety.”98
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence suggesting that pretrial
detention actually increases an individual’s likelihood of reoffending.99
According to the Probation and Pretrial Services Office: “Every day that
a defendant remains in custody, he or she may lose employment, which
in turn may lead to a loss of housing. These financial pressures may create
a loss of community ties, and ultimately push a defendant towards relapse
and/or new criminal activity.”100
2. The Court’s Analysis of the 1984 Amendments
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the 1984 Amendments—specifically, the pretrial
detention provisions.101 In Salerno, two defendants charged with multiple
counts of racketeering argued that their pretrial detention violated due
process prohibitions on excessive bail.102 The Second Circuit agreed with
the defendants and ruled that § 3142(e) violated due process and was
unconstitutional on its face.103
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
reversed that decision and upheld the constitutionality of the 1984
Amendments.104 Although the Chief Justice stated that “[i]n our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception,” he went on to justify detention prior to
conviction as laid out in the 1984 Amendments.105 The Court first
concluded that pretrial detention under the 1984 Amendments was not a

97. Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the Culture of
Detention, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS (July 2020).
98. Tiana Herring, Releasing People Pretrial Doesn’t Harm Public Safety, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Nov. 17, 2020).
99. Heaton, supra note 66 (“Furthermore, those detained pretrial are more likely to commit future
crimes, which suggests that detention may have a criminogenic effect.”).
100. Austin, supra note 8.
101. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
102. Id. at 746.
103. Id. at 741.
104. Id. at 755.
105. Id.
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punitive measure but a mere regulatory necessity.106 This was significant
because the Court had previously established in Bell v. Wolfish that
defendants may not be punished before trial.107 After deciding that
“preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal” and
therefore permissible for a judge to consider as part of the bail
determination, the Court described situations in which courts had found
that the government could permissibly hold a person in custody before
trial.108 These included times of war, illegal aliens awaiting deportation,
mentally unstable individuals, and flight risks.109
The Court ultimately held that the 1984 Amendments did not violate
due process, primarily because the Act contained “extensive safeguards”
in the detention hearing that would ensure only those individuals who
present “a demonstrable danger to the community” would be
incarcerated.110 Specifically, the Court found that safeguards such as the
“full-blown adversary hearing” in the presence of a “neutral
decisionmaker,” the guidance to the judge of “statutorily enumerated
factors” to consider when making his decision, and the defendant’s right
to counsel, all combined to provide sufficient procedural protections to
make the 1984 Amendments constitutional.111 Although the Court
acknowledged that circumstances may exist in which the 1984
Amendments would operate unconstitutionally, it was not a sufficient
threat to render the challenged provisions facially unconstitutional.112
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Salerno was brief, but he succinctly
summed up his beliefs regarding the fundamental constitutional flaw in
the 1984 Act, which was that “a pending indictment may not be given any
weight in evaluating an individual’s risk to the community or the need for
immediate detention.”113 Essentially, Justice Stevens argued that a person
cannot be found dangerous to the community based on a crime for which
he is presumptively innocent.114 Instead of a statutory presumption
against bail, Justice Stevens favored a case-by-case neutral analysis,
because “[i]f the evidence of imminent danger is strong enough to warrant
106. Id. at 747 (“The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did
not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals. Congress instead
perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem.”).
107. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions
or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of
the detainee.”).
108. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 750
111. Id. at 750-52.
112. Id. at 745.
113. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
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emergency detention, it should support that preventive measure
regardless of whether the person has been charged, convicted, or acquitted
of some other offense.”115
The scope of the government’s ability to detain not-yet-convicted
individuals resurfaced in 2003 in the context of immigration.116 In
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, the Court considered the constitutionality of
the detention of a South Korean immigrant who was convicted of petty
theft and thereby subject to deportation under a federal statute.117 Kim
argued that his detention prior to a deportation hearing violated his due
process rights because the government had not proven that he was a flight
risk or a danger to the community.118 The majority rejected Kim’s
argument, primarily because “Congress may make rules as to aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”119 Justice Souter, however,
saw things differently. In his dissent, Justice Souter insisted that because
Kim was a lawful permanent resident, he should have the same due
process rights as a U.S. citizen.120
After establishing that “the only reasonable starting point is the
traditional doctrine concerning the Government’s physical confinement
of individuals,” Justice Souter went on to lay out the due process rights
afforded to U.S. citizens in the context of pretrial detention.121 Reviewing
the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject, he began with the foundational
assumption that freedom from incarceration is “essential to the basic
definition of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution.”122 He then referred to the 1984 Amendments’ pretrial
detention of criminal defendants without bail, explaining that the Act was
only constitutional because of the “full-blown adversary hearing” and
because the statute “applied only to defendants suspected of ‘the most
serious of crimes.’”123 Justice Souter concluded by distilling the
“traditional doctrine” into a simple rule: “Due process calls for an
individual determination before someone is locked away.”124
In short, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the government may,
under certain circumstances, lock up individuals who are awaiting trial.
Additionally, the Court has tacitly endorsed the 1984 Amendments,
which included the presumption against bail for serious crimes. In both
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 547 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
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Salerno and Demore, the Court accorded great weight to the built-in
procedural safeguards that, in its view, prevented the pretrial detention
provisions of the 1984 Amendments from “selecting a class of people for
confinement on a categorical basis and denying members of that class any
chance to dispute the necessity of putting them away.”125 The statutorily
mandated individual hearing, heightened burden of proof, and limited
categories of those eligible for detention all served to render constitutional
what otherwise would be an affront to due process.
III. DISCUSSION
The federal presumption against bail for criminal defendants charged
with serious crimes is unconstitutional because it conditions a person’s
liberty on the nature of charges of which he is presumed innocent.126 The
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have ushered America into
a crisis of over-incarceration of its own citizens, and defendants being
held in custody prior to trial make up over twenty percent of those
incarcerated.127 The harms caused by excessive pretrial detention,
particularly of those charged with non-violent offenses such as drug
crimes, can be mitigated through the efforts of conscientious prosecutors
and judges.128 The ultimate solution, however, must involve a
restructuring of the law itself. Either § 3142(e)(3) must be repealed by
Congress or ruled unconstitutional by the Court.
In 2021, bipartisan bills were introduced in both the Senate and the
House with the title “Smarter Pretrial Detention for Drug Charges Act.”129
The bills, if enacted, would remove drug offenses from the list of crimes
that trigger the presumption against bail.130 The introduction of these bills
could indicate increasing congressional recognition of the harms caused
by expansive pretrial detention. Three months prior to the Senate bill’s
introduction, members of the United States House of Representatives
introduced a sweeping bail reform bill that would, among other things,
have eliminated the presumption against bail.131 Even though the bail
reform bill failed to get out of committee, its short life evinces the
growing awareness of the need to fundamentally restructure pretrial
detention procedures. The U.S. Congress is a slow-acting body, however,
125. Id. at 551-52.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
127. See Part I, page 1 supra.
128. Siegler & Harris, supra note 96. Siegler and Harris explain how prosecutors can choose not
to request pretrial detention for every permissible defendant in order to minimize pretrial detention.
129. Smarter Pretrial Detention for Drug Charges Act of 2021, S. 309, 117th Cong (2021); Smarter
Pretrial Detention for Drug Charges Act of 2021, H.R. 5722, 117th Cong (2021).
130. Id.
131. Federal Bail Reform Act of 2020, H.R. 9065, 116th Cong (2020).
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and a more direct approach would be for the Court to declare § 3142(e)(3)
unconstitutional.
This Part discusses three reasons why the Court should hold that the
federal presumption against bail for serious crimes is unconstitutional.
First, Part A addresses how the presumption is facially incompatible with
the procedural safeguards built into the rest of the Bail Reform Act.
Section B explains why judging danger to the community on the basis of
the charges against a criminal defendant violates the presumption of
innocence. Finally, Section C argues that the presumption against bail has
not been applied in line with the Court’s ruling in Salerno.
A. The 1984 Amendments is Internally Inconsistent
The text of § 3142(e)(3) states that “it shall be presumed that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if
the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the
person committed” one of a number of serious crimes.132 The
presumption is triggered when the defendant is charged with a serious
crime, which requires only a showing of probable cause.133 In the context
of the mandatory adversary hearing, however, the statute states that the
facts by which a judge supports a finding that an individual will be
dangerous to the community upon release must be supported by “clear
and convincing evidence.”134 Not only is clear and convincing evidence
a different evidentiary standard than probable cause, but requiring it also
makes it difficult to know how the presumption under § (e)(3) is meant to
be applied. If in practice, on a case-by-case basis, a federal judge truly
determined the flight risk of each defendant, and the State had the burden
in each instance to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, then
the presumption against release would be unnecessary.
The adversary hearing and the evidentiary standard it utilizes were key
safeguards that the Court relied on in Salerno.135 But if these protections
were actually effective, there would be no need for the presumption
against release to exist at all. The practical effect would be what Justice
Stevens advocated in his Salerno dissent, that if the evidence warranting
a person’s immediate and unconditional incarceration was so strong, then
it would carry that burden on its own, regardless of what particular crime
the prosecution was advancing.136
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
Rowland, supra note 7.
18 U.S.C. 3142(f).
See Part II(c)(2), page 15 supra.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 768 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. The Presumption Against Bail Violates the Presumption of Innocence
1. The Presumption of Danger to the Community is a Presumption of
Unproven Guilt
Historically, the foremost consideration of the bail system has been the
right to liberty.137 Before a person is convicted of a crime, he is free to go
where he wishes, and bail was only required to ensure a return to the court
for trial. When the Court decided Stack v. Boyle in 1951, a judge’s bail
determination was based on one variable: risk of the defendant’s flight.138
“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of that defendant.”139 Even after the 1966 Act,
judges setting a defendant’s bail would only consider what amount was
necessary to secure the defendant’s return for trial.140 The 1984
Amendments, however, added a new consideration to the bail decision—
safety of the community if the defendant were to be released.141 Now,
instead of only considering the risk of flight, judges were considering the
likelihood that the person would commit crimes in the future, then
granting or denying liberty based on their speculations about these future
crimes.142
Although the two concepts may seem intimately related, judging a
person’s danger to the community based on the severity of the charges
against him necessarily requires a judgment of that person’s guilt or
innocence, which the flight risk analysis does not. In Bell v. Wolfish, the
Court recognized the distinction between detaining a person based on a
judgment of guilt and detaining based on procedural necessity.143
Detention to ensure the defendant returns for trial falls into the procedural
category. A person might not come back for trial, even if he is innocent,
for any number of reasons. Fear of an unjust conviction could keep an
137. Austin, supra note 8.
138. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
139. Id.
140. See supra, Part II(B)(2).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (“If … the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”).
142. Rowland, supra note 7 (“The statutory provisions allowing for detention on grounds of danger
to the community and the presumption of detention in certain cases had a direct impact on pretrial release
rates. … By 2000, when the tough on crime approach was in full swing, the conviction rate had climbed
11 percentage points, imprisonment was part of the sentence for 9 out of 10 those convicted, and the
average prison term imposed increased by 5 months (AO); defendants had to serve at least 85 percent of
their time regardless of their behavior while an inmate, and regardless of the risk they presented for
recidivism.”).
143. See Part II(A), page 7 supra.
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innocent person from returning for trial. Defendants might fail to appear
for personal reasons, the inability to find childcare, or fear of losing a
job.144 A defendant may also simply forget to come back for his trial.145
These can all factor into a judge’s decision to detain a certain defendant
pretrial without any judgment of guilt.
Danger to the community, however, requires a fundamentally different
analysis. In order to assess dangerousness, a judge must decide if a person
is likely to commit future crimes—in other words, if he is fundamentally
a guilty person—and the judge must decide this at a hearing for which the
defendant has had barely any chance to prepare.146 This goes beyond any
sort of fact-based analysis that would occur at trial and instead requires a
judge to make a subjective assessment of the defendant’s character. It
essentially requires the judge to decide if the defendant is going to be
guilty of committing dangerous crimes in the future, under unforeseen
circumstances, at an unknown time.147 At the most basic level, this is an
incredibly difficult question for a judge to answer.
Because this assessment is so speculative, the judge making this
determination should only consider established facts and proven guilt
when deciding whether to lock a person up based on dangerousness.
However, the presumption against bail instead starts the defendant off in
a position of guilt based solely on the crime with which he is charged.148
The presumption is triggered merely by a showing of probable cause,
which is the same standard required to charge a person with a crime in the
first place.149
2. Detention Based on Unproven Guilt Violates the Presumption of
Innocence
The fundamental flaw of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), however, is not
144. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85. U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 742 (2018).
145. Id.
146. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), the bail hearing must be held no more than five business days after
the defendant’s initial appearance before the court. Often, the only evidence that the defendant knows the
prosecutor will bring to the bail hearing is the pretrial services report. Therefore, a defendant essentially
has to respond to the government’s evidence without any chance to prepare.
147. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 766 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Imprisonment
to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is . . . unprecedented in this country and .
. . fraught with danger of excesses and injustice.” (quoting Williamson v. United States, 95 L. Ed. 1379,
1382 (1950))).
148. Rowland, supra note 7 (explaining how the presumption “flips” the burden of proof from the
prosecutor to the defendant, who must then demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community in order
to be released on bail).
149. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (“A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention
has not been adjudged guilty of any crime. He has had only a ‘judicial determination of probable cause as
a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following arrest.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975))).
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simply that it includes danger to the community as a factor when
evaluating a person’s right to liberty. Instead, the problem is that this
danger is determined, at least in part, by the charges a prosecutor chooses
to bring against the defendant.150 Danger to the community is not
inherently an unconstitutional reason for detention.151 In fact, preventing
a person from committing future crimes is one of the fundamental
justifications of punishment that underly the institution of
incarceration.152 However, an assessment of danger to the community
cannot be based on the nature of a pending charge, of which the defendant
is presumptively innocent.153 As Justice White wrote in Coffin: “[i]n some
cases presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person guilty, though there
be no express proof of the fact to be committed by him, but then it must
be very warily pressed, for it is better five guilty persons should escape
unpunished than one innocent person should die.”154 A person’s
subsequent conviction does not justify his pretrial detention.
It is unconstitutional for a judge to decide guilt or innocence without a
trial and before the defendant has had the opportunity to prepare a
defense. Unfortunately, the majority opinion in Salerno did not find a
problem with a judge assessing the potential dangerousness of criminal
defendants before trial.155 Chief Justice Rehnquist defended it by saying
that “[t]he procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood
of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further the accuracy
of that determination.”156 By making that assertion in defense of the
pretrial detention statute, however, the Court failed to address the crux of
the issue. Regardless of whether the judge’s determination is accurate as
to a defendant’s dangerousness, the defendant’s constitutional rights were
150. Rowland, supra note 7 (“Prosecutors are responsible for timely and just charging decisions,
and for seeking detention when needed to protect individuals and the community and ensure the return of
defendants for future proceedings.”)
151. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (“We have repeatedly held that the
Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an
individual's liberty interest.” The court goes on to list a number of examples when community safety was
held to be a constitutional reason for detention, including wartime, insurrection, mentally unstable
persons).
152. Shira Scheindlin, former U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York, The
Hardest Thing About Being a Judge? What Courts Say About Sentencing. CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE
(2020) (“Every first-year law student learns that sentencing has four goals: retribution, incapacitation,
deterrence and rehabilitation.”).
153. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (“Guilt in a criminal case must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law
tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent
with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.”).
154. Coffin v. United States 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895).
155. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
156. Id.
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violated because the judge made the decision unilaterally under a statute
directing him to assume that dangerousness based on crimes of which the
defendant had not been convicted. Because finding a person dangerous to
the community requires a finding of guilty character, a person charged
with one of these serious federal crimes, who is presumed to be dangerous
to the community based solely on a charge, is also presumed to be guilty.
C. The Presumption Against Bail Is Wrongly Applied
In each case where the Supreme Court has considered the scope of the
government’s right to detain criminal defendants pretrial, the Court
accorded great weight to the “extensive” safeguards that, in its view,
counterbalanced the effect of the presumption against bail.157 In Salerno,
the Court listed the mandatory adversary hearing, the neutral judge, the
right to counsel, and the predetermined factors to be considered by the
judge when deciding whether to award pretrial release.158 All of these
protections, in the Court’s opinion, would prevent the presumption of
detention from getting out of hand. Justice Souter’s dissent in Demore
reiterated that pretrial detention should be used in a limited and
individually tailored manner.159 He contended that it would be
unconstitutional to single out “a class of people for confinement on a
categorical basis.”160 Unfortunately, things have not turned out the way
the Court hoped that they would.
Under the 1984 Amendments to the Bail Reform Act, Congress
intended that pretrial detention be reserved for “the worst of the worst”
criminal defendants.161 Given this, the fact that more than three-fourths
of federal defendants are subject to pretrial detention should be a red flag
that our system is not functioning as it was originally intended. Alison
Siegler has chronicled how prosecutors and courts have shifted from the
original intention of the presumption against bail: “the [Bail Reform Act]
only authorizes pretrial jailing under very limited circumstances. But
many of the players have forgotten the statutory rules, and in some cases,
judges and prosecutors are jailing people for reasons not authorized by
those rules.”162
In 1987, these questions of presuming innocence and guilt with regard
to release on bond appeared to be largely intellectual exercises—not many
federal defendants were jailed pretrial. But today, the justice system is
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Part II(C)(2), page 16 supra.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 551-52 (2003).
Id.
Austin, supra note 8.
Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 97.
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feeling the strain of an over-populated prison system and reaping the
rewards of the failed war on drugs. Although it may be only a small
portion of the mammoth-sized problem of mass incarceration, federal
pretrial detention rates have slowly risen to alarming levels since the 1984
Amendments was passed.163 The shift has been gradual, but over the past
forty years, the rate has increased from nineteen percent in 1985 to
seventy-five percent in 2019.164 The system is now at a point where “in
practice it deprives nearly every person awaiting trial in a federal drug
case of their liberty,” even though Congress’s original intent was to lock
up only the ‘worst of the worst’ offenders awaiting trial.”165
IV. CONCLUSION
The Salerno opinion referred to the “alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release” that prompted Congress to pass the
1984 Amendments in the first place.166 After living with the 1984
Amendments for almost 40 years, however, we have learned that the
problem might not be as alarming as the Court feared. Even with data
showing that less than two percent of defendants commit crimes on
pretrial release,167 judges are strongly motivated not to release defendants
who have even an inkling of potential to commit future crimes and very
little motivation to err on the side of pretrial release. Magistrate judges,
many of whom handle a large number of federal bond hearings,168 must
consider running for reappointment and are unlikely to want an
improperly released defendant on their record.169 Although these
concerns may be understandable, they must give way to the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. Until a defendant is afforded due process
and given the opportunity to have his case tried before a jury, he must be
regarded as innocent until proven guilty. The federal presumption of
detention takes away that right by assuming dangerousness based on the
mere fact that a defendant was charged with a serious crime. Such a
defendant is no longer innocent until proven guilty; he is innocent until
suspected guilty.

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Siegler & Harris, supra note 96.
166. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987).
167. See Part II(C)(1), page 15 supra.
168. Magistrate judges conducted 49,936 bail hearings in the 12-month period ending September
2013. See Phillip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present but Unaccounted For, 16 Nev. L.J.
783, 790 (2016).
169. Id.
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